

countered by our past two Ambassadors, both of whom left the country in a less than cordial atmosphere. Our political interests far surpass any strategic or commercial value we might place in that country, and recent developments might find us in a position of defending political commitments which do not necessarily relate to our national security.

An article written by Henry Tanner and published in the New York Times of August 3, 1967, aptly portrays the scope of American involvement at the present time. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

KINSHASA, THE CONGO, August 2.—No other nation, not even Belgium, is as deeply involved in the Congo as is the United States.

The American involvement here goes back to 1960 when, shortly before the downfall of Patrice Lumumba, the first Premier, the Soviet Union tried to turn the Congo into a Soviet outpost in Africa. American influence on President Joseph Kasavubu was instrumental in getting the Soviet and Czechoslovak embassies evicted.

Since then the Soviet Union has made no serious attempt to turn the Congo into a cold-war battlefield. The Soviet Embassy later reopened, and it closed again some three years ago. Now Soviet-Congolese negotiations are once more under way and informed sources predict that fairly soon the Soviet Union will open an embassy again.

The American commitment, meanwhile, remained. Over the years both the embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency have taken a hand in shaping things here.

For instance, the agency financed and organized a company called Wigmo, an acronym for Western International Ground Maintenance Organization, which was incorporated in Liechtenstein. The company's task was to look after the planes used by the Congolese armies and the mercenaries in the fight against the left-wing rebels in Eastern Province.

The pilots who flew the planes, mostly Cubans, also were recruited and paid through C.I.A. channels.

Over the last two years the covert part of American activities here is understood to have been sharply reduced.

Wigmo is no longer financed by the United States, but by the Congolese Government instead. The last Cuban pilots have left. And C.I.A. money which, in the early years, found its way into the pockets of local politicians, is no longer flowing.

But the American influence is still predominant. Embassy officials are in almost constant touch with the President and key Cabinet ministers. Neither the Belgians nor the French have comparable access. Often, therefore, Belgian grievances are being presented to the Congolese by American diplomats.

What has happened, in a sense, is that the United States and Belgium divide the role that the former colonial powers, such as France, normally played alone in their colonies.

The Belgian part is being played by more than 1,000 teachers, some 1,700 technical-assistance workers and several thousand other technicians and by the Belgian community at large—planters, missionaries and businessmen of all kinds. There are 40,000 to 50,000 Belgians in the country.

However, it is the United States rather than the Belgian Government that provides the strategic support, advice and political influence and bears the biggest part of the burden of financial aid.

Annual American financial assistance averages \$50-million, which is used for imports of industrial machinery, trucks, chemicals and textiles for an economy that is kept running mainly by the Belgian business community.

This division of labor between American "strategic support" and Belgian "presence" has been working well on the official level. Individual Belgians often find it hard to take. A Belgian company manager who spent most of his life here may be prepared to ask for the American Embassy's help in dealing with a Congolese minister but he finds it galling to do so.

The popular Belgian view is that nothing can happen here without the approval of the Americans, and the Americans are often blamed, therefore, for everything from nationalization of Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, the mining company, on down.

American and Belgian interests, of course, are different here.

The Belgians, with their large community, their families and investments, need a Congo that is not completely "congolized."

American policies according to United States officials, are aimed at making it possible for the Belgian community to stay, because without the Belgians the economy would collapse.

But, unlike the Belgians, the United States could let the Congo find her own level, if need be. The United States has no American community and almost no investments to protect. It is giving aid to the Congolese, not the European community, and its stake in the country would remain even if Europeans could no longer live here with their families.

But the exercise of American power has often been frustrating.

All of the first three United States Ambassadors were in difficulty when they left: The first, Clare H. Timberlake, because he clashed with the United Nations; the second, Edmund A. Gullion, because the Congolese felt that he was giving too much support to the United Nations, and the third, George McMurtrie Godley 2d, because American policy required him to give General Mobutu advice he did not want.

U.S. POSITION STRONG

The new Ambassador, Robert H. McBride, who arrived just before the revolt of the mercenaries, is keeping his fingers crossed.

Just now the American position here is extremely strong, thanks in part to the three Air Force C-130 transports that were sent to give the Congolese Army logistical support against the mercenaries in the fighting last month.

There are potential weaknesses, however.

The Americans are lonely here. As the Belgians and other Western powers reduce their commitments to the Congo, the American involvement becomes relatively greater and deeper.

Second, the American position became more brittle and vulnerable when General Mobutu moved into the Presidency. One European diplomat calls the general "the last card" of the United States in the Congo.

The general always had American support. From 1960 to November, 1965, he was the power-behind-the-power, ready to move in, if necessary, while President Kasavubu and his successive Premiers also had United States backing.

Now, General Mobutu is in power, and there is no visible alternative or successor.

THE WAR ON POVERTY—A COMPASSIONATE PROGRAM

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I am proud to invite the attention of Senators to an editorial published recently in the

Tulsa, Okla., Eagle. Citing the success of war on poverty programs in the Tulsa area, the editorial rightly stresses the important progress that can be made when government is responsive to the needs and aspirations of a local community. We can be especially proud that in the Tulsa area our economically disadvantaged fellow citizens are actively involved in the process by which they may achieve self-sufficiency. As the editorial says:

Under their own initiative they are holding their neighborhood councils together, pinpointing their needs, promoting projects on their own to better their way of life and voicing their minds in no uncertain terms on decisions being made which affect their welfare.

I was happy to see that the same editorial highlighted a recent column by Roscoe Drummond, who said:

The Nation as a whole has come to accept the war on poverty as one of the most compassionate, humane and intelligent programs of the Johnson administration.

The Office of Economic Opportunity and the community action program in Tulsa are to be congratulated for the success story described in the editorial. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Tulsa (Okla.) Eagle, June 8, 1967]

THE PEOPLE'S EYES ARE OPENING

The columnist, Roscoe Drummond, in one of his columns in the Tulsa Daily World, makes four significant statements in his discussion on the war on poverty.

They read: "The American people are making no mistake in giving their strong support to the war on poverty.

"Voters are 60 per cent behind the war on poverty and want it continued or expanded, the Harris survey shows.

"Public support has been growing steadily for the last seven months. The nation as a whole has come to accept the war on poverty as one of the most compassionate, humane and intelligent programs of the Johnson Administration."

Assuming that this columnist's observations are correct, it is safe to assume that the change in attitude toward government help and the use of federal funds to help eliminate poverty and the attendant evils, is proof again that if we give the people light they will find their way.

This truth was never more evident than in the transformation which is taking place among the rank and file of the citizens of Tulsa.

The Community Action program in Tulsa got off to a slow start because of conflicting ideas about how and who was to wage the war against poverty in our area. But now the lines are drawn, the policies clear and the objectives well defined.

The Economic Opportunity program is designed to do three things: first educate and train the unemployed and the under-employed; second, provide employment for the unemployed and thirdly, provide that all Americans shall live in decency and with dignity. And these aims are not to be achieved for the economically disadvantaged, but with them, by them and through them.

It is gratifying to note that there is a representative sized hard core of citizens in Tulsa, living in the target areas, who understand this and are beginning to insist that this is the way its going to be.